Social Psychology and the Pragmatic Conduct of Science

We chart our agreements and disagreements with Wallach and Wallach’s (2001) arguments. After listing some areas of agreement, we then make four arguments that undermine the Wallachs’ project. First, we argue the discovery of ‘laws’ is a goal neither of scientists nor of the discipline. Second, we suggest the Wallachs’ claim that social psychological theories are infused with unfalsifiable theories about the nature of psychological variables misses the logical distinction between measurement models and conceptual hypotheses. Third, we look at the role that circularity plays in deductive logic and conclude that circularity is rarely a serious problem in practice. Fourth, we examine what effect bits of research have on scientific progress, and argue that ‘non-progressive’ papers do not hinder progress. The best response to the Wallachs’ concerns about social psychology is provided by a glance at progress within the field today. The state is very good; circularities, tautologies and untested assumptions do not pose a significant threat to progress in the science of social psychology.