Monotone operator methods for Nash equilibria in non-potential games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We observe that a significant class of Nash equilibrium problems in non-potential games can be associated with monotone inclusion problems. We propose splitting techniques to solve such problems and establish their convergence. Applications to generalized Nash equilibria, zero-sum games, and cyclic proximation problems are demonstrated.
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تاریخ انتشار 2012