Phenotypical Behavior and Evolutionary Slavery

The Prisoner Dilemma has basically two known type of evolutive answers that allow cooperation among individuals. One proposes cooperation is possible among close relatives. The other is a strategy on when to cooperate and when not to, according to the actions of the other players. An example of these strategies is playing tit-fortat. This paper proposes a third and completely different solution to the evolutionary problem of cooperation, based on the fact that a specific gene needs not fix completely the behavior of the individual. It is a valid genetic instruction to create individuals with the same gene that have a chance of behaving one way and a chance of behaving differently, or, in other words, have different phenotypical strategies. We will see that, depending on the paremetrs of the game, there is a better genetic strategy than the previous ones mentioned above. That is done creating individuals with a phenotypical behavior to serve the other members of their species and others who will be served. This creates a type of evolutionary slavery. The species is divided into two kind of beings, called here as leaders and servants, and we show that this is evolutionary favorable to the species, as well as a stable solution. Moreover, genes playing always cooperate inside the family or even tit-for-tat are found to have no barrier against an invasion by this new strategy. It is also shown that this result does not apply only to the Prisoner Dilemma but can be generalized to other evolutionary games among individuals, as long as they have the right parameters, actually increasing the fitness of the species. Depending on the parameters of the game it is a stable and best solution to choose nondominant strategies, different for the leaders and the servants, even when a dominant strategy is available to them. Possible applications of this strategy to problems as the appearance of multi-cellular beings and some charactstics of human behavior are proposed and shortly disccussed and it is verified that this new approach to the solution of Evolutionary Game Theory problems can lead to some very interesting consequences and explanations of known facts.