Continuous Approximations of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics

نویسندگان

  • Valentina Corradi
  • Rajiv Sarin
چکیده

Continuous approximations that are ordinary differential equations (ODEs) or stochastic differential equations (SDEs) are often used to study the properties of discrete stochastic processes. We show that different ways of taking the continuous limit of the same model may result in either an ODE or a SDE and study the manner in which each approximates the discrete model. We compare the asymptotic properties of the continuous equations with those of the discrete dynamics and show that they tend to provide a better approximation when a greater amount of variance of the discrete model is preserved in the continuous limit. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: C6, C7, D8 2000

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

A new approach on studying the stability of evolutionary game dynamics for financial systems

‎Financial market modeling and prediction is a difficult problem and drastic changes of the price causes nonlinear dynamic that makes the price prediction one of the most challenging tasks for economists‎. ‎Since markets always have been interesting for traders‎, ‎many traders with various beliefs are highly active in a market‎. ‎The competition among two agents of traders‎, ‎namely trend follo...

متن کامل

روش‌های مدل‌سازی تطوری در اقتصاد (با تاکید بر عناصر مشترک سازنده آنها)

In this paper we have tried mention to some sort of thewell-known evolutionary modeling approaches in economic territory such as Multi Agent simulations, Evolutionary Computation and Evolutionary Game Theory. As it has been mentioned in the paper, in recent years, the number of Evolutionary contributions applied to Multi-Agent models increased remarkably. However until now there is no consensus...

متن کامل

Dynamics in Games

The purpose of the course is to study several dynamics generated by strategic interactions in games. Among the topics are adaptive dynamics in evolutionary game theory, robust procedures for on-line algorithms and stochastic approximation. 1. Fictitious play Discrete time Continuous time and best reply dynamics 2. Replicator dynamics n populations One population Evolutionary Stable Strategies 3...

متن کامل

A stochastic model of evolutionary dynamics with deterministic large-population asymptotics.

An evolutionary birth-death process is proposed as a model of evolutionary dynamics. Agents residing in a continuous spatial environment X, play a game G, with a continuous strategy set S, against other agents in the environment. The agents' positions and strategies continuously change in response to other agents and to random effects. Agents spawn asexually at rates that depend on their curren...

متن کامل

Fixation, transient landscape, and diffusion dilemma in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics.

Agent-based stochastic models for finite populations have recently received much attention in the game theory of evolutionary dynamics. Both the ultimate fixation and the pre-fixation transient behavior are important to a full understanding of the dynamics. In this paper, we study the transient dynamics of the well-mixed Moran process through constructing a landscape function. It is shown that ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • J. Economic Theory

دوره 94  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2000