How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting
نویسندگان
چکیده
Approval balloting is applied to the problem of electing a representative committee. We demonstrate several procedures for determining a committee based on approval ballots, paying particular attention to weighting methods that can reduce the in¤uence of voters with extreme views. We show that a general class of voting systems based on approval ballots can be implemented through analysis of appropriate tables. A by-product of this procedure is a clari£cation of the complexity of these systems.
منابع مشابه
Electing Committees by Approval Balloting
We study committee election models where voters' approvals over candidates are collected and the election outcome is determined according to a predetermined voting rule, in particular issue-wise majority rule. The properties of these models are investigated with a special attention to representativeness of the election outcomes, where representativeness relates to the way they are consistent wi...
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