Employer Learning and General Human Capital∗
نویسنده
چکیده
We develop a model where competing employers gradually learn about a worker’s productivity, like in the standard Jovanovic (1979) learning model. Rather than assuming that productivity is match-specific, we allow for general human capital productivity. We consider competitive wage determination through matching wage offers and counter-offers. We can also characterize the wage dynamics. Some of the results we obtain are similar to those under match-specific human capital. Others differ considerably.
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