The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations. By John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 376p. $83.99 cloth, $24.99 paper

up to that fact that the Founders retained elements of monarchy and prerogative in the Constitution, to be invoked during crises (genuine or staged). Second, all three books essentially tell a top-down story about the power play between the three federal branches, but they barely discuss the institutional balance of power, which is itself a result of public opinion, and, in particular, the distinct susceptibility of public opinion to presidential persuasion in moments of crisis. There is presidential power and there is war power (and there is presidential war power.) War powers open our eyes to the upper limit of presidential power, because it is just where prerogative is most in need and expansive indeed. As the American people were shell-shocked after the events of September 11, it was in this fluid and conducive environment that the Authorization for Use of Military Force Revolution (2001), the Iraq Joint Resolutions (2002), and the USA Patriot Act (2001) were passed. Third, I wonder if it would have been rewarding for the authors to have toyed with the possibility that the Bush administration’s road to constitutional hell was lined with at least some good intentions, or even the possibility that what Bush did was constitutional, in the sense that while our Constitution was arguably stretched beyond recognition, we did not, and probably shall never, invoke its provisions for impeachment. And if so, either our Constitution is more elastic than we have expected, or presidential war power in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 could well have been sui generis because the president was allowed to cry wolf for up to six years, but not much more. Nevertheless, Ball, Bruff, and Pfiffner are right to remind us that as regards presidential power, and especially presidential war power, we need to stay ever vigilant.