Beliefs about Thinking

Attempts to improve thinking and reasoning assume that people do not think as well as they might. The actual conduct of thinking does not measure up to an ideal standard. For example, I and others have argued that people are often biased toward views they already hold. They often fail to consider alternative views, counter-evidence, or goals that their favorite plans will subvert. In making this argument, I hold up (and defend) a standard of active open-mindedness as an ideal. Yet, people have their own standards. They are capable of thinking of themselves as careful, fair-minded, thoughtless, biased, decisive, faithful to their beliefs, or wishy-washy. They also apply these standards to others, as when they judge their friends, co-workers, or political leaders. I shall argue here (with some preliminary data) that part of the discrepancy between people’s thinking and ideal standards is that people’s own standards differ from the ideal. Thus, people who think poorly by ideal standards may reject those standards. They may think they are thinking well when they are actually thinking badly. This argument implies that the teaching of thinking may involve modification of people’s standards. It is not just a matter of prodding people to live up to the standards they already hold. My argument requires a specification of good thinking. If we are to claim that people are thinking badly and don’t know it, we need a clear standard that we can oppose to theirs. I shall therefore begin with a summary of the theory of good thinking explained in Baron (1985, 1988). I shall then discuss its implications for the formation of standards about thinking. Following this, I shall present some preliminary evidence concerning judgments of thinking.