Compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper deals with bankruptcy situations in which in addition to the claims, an exogenously given reference point for the allocation of the estate is present. We introduce and analyse two types of compromise solutions and show that they coincide with the τ value of two corresponding TU games. We apply our solutions to a real-life case of allocating university money to degree courses. JEL-code: C71.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Annals OR
دوره 158 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008