Deciding Monotonic Games

نویسندگان

  • Parosh Aziz Abdulla
  • Ahmed Bouajjani
  • Julien d'Orso
چکیده

In an earlier work [AČJYK00] we presented a general framework for verification of infinite-state transition systems, where the transition relation is monotonic with respect to a well quasi-ordering on the set of states. In this paper, we investigate extending the framework from the context of transition systems to that of games. We show that monotonic games are in general undecidable. We identify a subclass of monotonic games, called downward closed games. We provide algorithms for analyzing downward closed games subject to winning conditions which are formulated as safety properties.

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تاریخ انتشار 2003