A Defense of Contingent Logical Truths∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
A formula is a contingent logical truth when it is true in every model M but, for some model M , false at some world of M . We argue that there are such truths, given the logic of actuality. Our argument turns on defending Tarski’s definition of truth and logical truth, extended so as to apply to modal languages with an actuality operator. We argue that this extension is the philosophically proper account of validity. We counter recent arguments to the contrary presented in William Hanson’s ‘Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth’ (Philosophical Studies, 130 (2006): 437–459). In a paper of 1988, Edward Zalta argues that there are logical truths and analytic truths that are not necessary. Primary examples are instances of the schema
منابع مشابه
The Vicious Triangle of a Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth
In this paper, I argue against the view there are contingent a priori truths, and against the related view that there are contingent logical truths. I will suggest that in general, predicates ›a priori‹ and ›contingent‹ are implicitly relativized to circumstances, and argue that apriority entails necessity, whenever the two are relativized to the same circumstance. I will then criticize the ide...
متن کاملArithmetical Knowledge and Arithmetical Definability: Four Studies
by Sean Walsh The subject of this dissertation is arithmetical knowledge and arithmetical definability. The first two chapters contain respectively a critique of a logicist account of a preferred means by which we may legitimately infer to arithmetical truths and a tentative defense of an empiricist account. According to the logicist account, one may infer from quasi-logical truths to patently ...
متن کاملSuperfi cially and Deeply Contingent A Priori Truths
In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s (1980) discussion of proper names and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals. In particular, I discuss Evans’ (1979) distinction between superfi cially and deeply contingent truths. I shall raise doubts about Evans’ strategy in general, and also about the roots and meaningfulness ...
متن کاملHow negative truths are made true
Aaron M. Griffith Identifying plausible truthmakers for negative truths has been a serious and perennial problem for truthmaker theory. I argue here that negative truths (in particular contingent negative existential truths) are indeed made true but not in the way that positive truths are. I rely on a distinction between “existence-independence” and “variation-independence” drawn by Hofmann and...
متن کاملForthcoming In Byrne and Thomson (eds.) Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker
2. The first of our trio, physicalism, is the thesis that, not necessarily but as a matter of fact, everything is physical. This thesis stands in need of clarification. For one thing, we need to be told what it is to be physical. This is a difficult and somewhat neglected question, but I want to set it aside. A rough and ready understanding will do for present purposes. Another aspect of the th...
متن کامل