Participation in fraudulent elections

I analyze a costly voting model of elections, where the incumbent can stuff the ballot box, to investigate how electoral fraud affects voters’ participation decisions. I find that two stable equilibria may exist: full abstention equilibrium, where the incumbent wins with certainty and which exists only if the incumbent’s capability to stuff a ballot box is sufficiently strong; and a more efficient coordination equilibrium, where a substantial share of a challenger’s supporters vote and the probability of the incumbent’s defeat is large. Since voters do not take into account positive externality they produce on other voters when deciding to cast their votes, participation in coordination equilibrium is still inefficiently low, and thus subsidization as well as introducing compulsory voting may improve efficiency. Because the higher capability of the incumbent to stuff a ballot box discourages participation of his own supporters and creates coordination incentives for the challenger’s supporters, higher fraud does not always benefit the incumbent even when costless. Additionally, the model simultaneously explains two empirical observations about fraudulent elections: a positive relationship between fraud and victory margin and a negative effect of fraud on turnout. JEL Classification: D72, D73