A New Simplified Derivation of Nash Bargaining Solution
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چکیده
Abstract In the 1950s, the Nobel Prize winner John F. Nash has shown that under certain conditions, the best solution to the bargaining problem is when the product of the (increase in) utilities is the largest. Nash’s derivation assumed that we are looking for strategies that assign a single situation to each bargaining situation. In this paper, we propose a simplified derivation of Nash bargaining solution that does not requires this assumption.
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تاریخ انتشار 2008