Multidimensional Voting under Uncertainty ∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
The nonexistence of equilibria in platform setting games with mutliple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper we relax the stardard assumption that parties either have perfect information about the electorate or that they behave as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties are instead uncertainty averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result.
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