Dynamic Epistemic Logic I: Modeling Knowledge and Belief
نویسنده
چکیده
Dynamic epistemic logic, broadly conceived, is the study of logics of information change. In this first paper, I introduce the basic logical systems for reasoning about the knowledge and beliefs of a group of agents.
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Epistemic Logic Part I: Modeling Knowledge and Belief
The first to propose a (modal) logic of knowledge and belief was Jaako Hintikka in his seminal book Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions, published in 1962. However, the general study of formal semantics for knowledge and belief (and their logic) really began to flourish in the 1990s with fundamental contributions from computer scientists (Fagin et al., 1995; Me...
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Dynamic epistemic logic, broadly conceived, is the study of logics of information change. Inference, communication and observation are typical examples of informative events which have been subjected to a logical analysis. This article will introduce and critically examine a number of different logical systems that have been used to reason about the knowledge and beliefs of a group of agents du...
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