Emediator : a next Generation Electronic Commerce Server Emediator: a next Generation Electronic Commerce Server
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper presents eMediator, a next generation electronic commerce server that demonstrates some ways in which AI, algorithmic support, and game theoretic incentive engineering can jointly improve the eeciency of ecommerce. First, its conngurable auction house includes a variety of generalized combinatorial auctions, price setting mechanism, novel bid types, mobile agents, and user support for choosing an auction type. Second, its leveled commitment contract optimizer determines the optimal contract price and decommitting penalties for a variety of leveled commitment contracting protocols, taking into account that rational agents will decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Third, its safe exchange planner enables unenforced anonymous exchanges by dividing the exchange into chunks and se-quencing those chunks to be delivered safely in alternation between the buyer and the seller. Each of the three components is based on different types of game theoretic equilibrium analysis, and also required development of new algorithms and GUI designs to make it feasible. 1
منابع مشابه
Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts
In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts | i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty | were recently shown to improve Pareto ef-ciency even if agents rationally decommit in Nash equilibrium using innated thresholds on how good their outside ooers must be bef...
متن کاملAlgorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts
In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty were recently shown to improve Pareto efficiency even if agents rationally decommit in Nash equilibrium using inflated thresholds on how good their outside offers must be befo...
متن کاملRevenue Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts Revenue Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts
In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts | i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty|were recently shown to improve expected social welfare even if agents decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Such contracts diier based on whether agents have to declare ...
متن کاملRevenue Equivalence of Leveled CommitmentContractsTuomas
In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts | i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty|were recently shown to improve expected social welfare even if agents decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Such contracts diier based on whether agents have to declare ...
متن کاملApproaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, i.e. auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more eecient allocations than traditional auctions in multi-item auctions where the agents' valuations of the items are not additive. However, determining the winners so as to maximize revenue is NP-complete. First, existing approaches for tackling this problem are reviewed: exhaustive enu-mera...
متن کامل