On finding an envy-free Pareto-optimal division
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper describes an algorithm to find an (a-)envy-free Pareto-optimal division in the case of a finite number of homogeneous infinitely divisible goods and linear utility functions. It is used to find an allocation in the classical cake division problem that is almost Pareto-op timat and o-envy-free. 9 1998 The Mathematical Pregraming, Society, Inc. Published by Elsevier Science B.V_
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Math. Program.
دوره 83 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1998