Rationality and equilibrium in perfect-information games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In generic perfect-information games the unique Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) outcome is identical to the one predicted by several rationalizability notions, like Extensive-Form Rationalizability (EFR), the Backward Dominance Procedure (BDP), and Extensive-Form Rationalizability of the Agent form (AEFR). We show that, in contrast, within the general class of perfect information games all these solution concepts are genuinely distinct in terms of the outcomes that they predict: SPE is more restrictive than EFR, which is in turn more restrictive than BDP, which is, finally, more restrictive than AEFR.
منابع مشابه
Reinforcement Learning in Perfect-Information Games∗
This paper studies action-based reinforcement learning in finite perfectioninformation games. Restrictions on the valuation updating rule that guarantee that the play eventually converges to a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) are identified. These conditions are mild enough to contain interesting and plausible learning behavior. We provide two examples of such updating rule that suggest ...
متن کاملGeneralized reinforcement learning in perfect-information games
This paper studies action-based reinforcement learning in finite perfectinformation games. Restrictions on the valuation updating rule that that are necessary and sufficient for the play to converge to a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) are identified. These conditions encompass well-known examples of reinforcement learning and are mild enough to contain other interesting and plausible l...
متن کاملTR-2009006: Intelligent Players
Rational decisions depend on what players know, hence an appropriate epistemic analysis is an integral element of the foundations of Game Theory. We suggest a general logical approach for studying games which consists of formalizing rationality and games in epistemic logic and deriving their properties in the resulting logical system. We study a number of examples and demonstrate that our model...
متن کاملIntelligent Players
Rational decisions depend on what players know, hence an appropriate epistemic analysis is an integral element of the foundations of Game Theory. We suggest a general logical approach for studying games which consists of formalizing rationality and games in epistemic logic and deriving their properties in the resulting logical system. We study a number of examples and demonstrate that our model...
متن کاملIndividual Rationality in Collective Choice
This paper studies the rationality of an individual player in sequential games of perfect information played with other players who are not necessarily rational. The paper proposes a set of properties on the choice behavior and shows that they are equivalent to the rationality of an individual player at the initial node independently of the behavioral norm of the other players. Furthermore, I s...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011