The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Developing Countries’ Unity in International Politics∗

With the post-Cold War rise of major developing countries blurring the distinction between the industrialized “North” and the developing “South,” it is unclear whether a state’s development level remains a strong predictor of its stances in international politics. Do Brazil, India, China, South Africa, and other major developing countries behave like members of the North, or the South? And having been left behind in some respects, do other parts of the global South rally behind the major developing countries, or the North, or neither? Numerous scholars and practitioners claim that economic disparities fracture the traditional Southern coalition: major developing countries break ranks as their growing wealth links them more tightly to the countries, institutions, and policies associated with the North. Yet other observers insist that the Southern coalition is not only intact but strengthened. Instead of dissociating from the South, major developing countries leverage their growing power to defend poorer states and challenge richer ones – and perhaps poorer states are abandoning support for the North while unifying behind these new leaders. We lay out six observable implications that should be in place if the Southern coalition is intact. Then we probe those implications with statistical analyses of over 3,600 paragraphs of text from states’ negotiations concerning trade and environmental policy. This policy space facilitates generalizability by representing fundamental sovereignty and wealth issues that have been at the heart of friction between states at different levels of development. Our finding – that overall, developing countries have maintained remarkable unity – weighs in on central debates in international relations, comparative politics, and political economy. ∗For excellent research assistance or helpful comments, we thank Duke students Irina Danescu, Sanjeev Dasgupta, Margaret Foster, and Shanelle Van. For useful comments, we thank seminar audiences at the annual conferences of the International Studies Association (ISA) and the International Political Economy Society (IPES).