Is Plea Bargaining in the ‘‘Shadow of the Trial’’ a Mirage?

نویسندگان

  • Shawn D. Bushway
  • Allison D. Redlich
چکیده

It has been well established that a ‘‘plea discount’’ or ‘‘trial penalty’’ exists, such that defendants who plead guilty receive significant sentencing discounts relative to what they would receive if convicted at trial. Theorists argue that the exact value of this plea discount is determined by bargaining ‘‘in the shadow of a trial,’’ meaning that plea decision-making is premised on the perceived probable outcome of a trial. In trials, the strength of the evidence against defendants greatly impacts the probability of conviction. In the present study, we estimate the probability of conviction at the individual level for those who pled guilty. We find that, contrary to the shadow of the trial model, evidentiary factors either do not impact or negatively impact the probability of conviction, which stands in stark contrast to the impact evidence has at trials. These findings suggest that plea bargain decision-making may not occur in the shadow of the trial.

منابع مشابه

An Explicit Test Of Plea Bargaining In The “ Shadow Of The Trial ”

Bargaining in the “shadow of the trial,” which hinges on the expectations of trial outcomes, is the primary theory used by noncriminologists to explain variation in the plea discount given to defendants who plead guilty. This study develops a formal mathematical representation of the theory and then presents an empirical test of the theory using an innovative online survey with responses to a h...

متن کامل

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Strategic Voting in a Jury Trial with Plea Bargaining

We study the criminal court process focusing on the interaction between plea bargaining and jury trials. We model plea bargaining such that a prosecutor makes a takeit-or-leave-it offer and a defendant, who is either guilty or innocent, pleads either guilty or not guilty. If the defendant pleads not guilty, the case goes to a jury trial, which follows a strategic voting model. Plea bargaining p...

متن کامل

Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem

The dominant theoretical model of plea bargaining predicts that, under conditions of full information and rational choice, criminal cases should uniformly be settled through plea bargaining. That prediction holds for innocent and guilty defendants alike. Because it is perfectly rational for innocent defendants to plead guilty, plea bargaining might be said to have an "innocence problem." Plea b...

متن کامل

Sentencing guidelines, judicial discretion and plea bargaining

The United States Sentencing Commission was created to develop federal sentencing guidelines, which restrict judicial discretion and were found to increase the average sentence length while leaving unchanged the likelihood of resolution through plea bargaining. A game theoretic model is developed in which a sentencing commission may impose guidelines or defer to judicial discretion; then a defe...

متن کامل

Plea Bargaining

Is plea bargaining, synonymous to pleading guilty. Day by day, partakers in criminal justice system are either in confusion or in an intellectual debate on the innovative changes in sentencing system under the Indian Criminal jurisprudence. Of course, root cause is the introduction of Chapter XXIA, in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, containing Sections 265 A to 265L, which deal with plea ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

متن کامل
عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2011