Risk transfer via energy-savings insurance
نویسنده
چکیده
Among the key barriers to investment in energy efficiency are uncertainties about attaining projected energy savings and potential disputes over stipulated savings. The fields of energy management and risk management are thus intertwined. While many technical methods have emerged to manage performance risks (e.g. building diagnostics and commissioning), financial methods are less developed in the energy management arena than in other segments of the economy. Energy-savings insurance (ESI)—formal insurance of predicted energy savings—transfers and spreads both types of risk over a larger pool of energy efficiency projects and reduces barriers to market entry of smaller energy service firms who lack sufficiently strong balance sheets to self-insure the savings. ESI encourages those implementing energy-saving projects to go beyond standard measures and thereby achieve more significant levels of energy savings. Insurance providers are proponents of improved savings measurement and verification techniques, as well as maintenance, thereby contributing to national energy-saving objectives. If properly applied, ESI can potentially reduce the net cost of energy-saving projects by reducing the interest rates charged by lenders, and by increasing the level of savings through quality control. Governmental agencies have been pioneers in the use of ESI and could continue to play a role. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.
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