Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?
نویسندگان
چکیده
Michael H. Rothkopf • Ronald M. Harstad • Yuhong Fu Rutgers Business School and RUTCOR, Rutgers University, 640 Bartholomew Road, Piscataway, New Jersey 08854-8003 Rutgers Business School and RUTCOR, Rutgers University, 640 Bartholomew Road, Piscataway, New Jersey 08854-8003 Moody’s, 96 Church Street, New York, New York 10007 [email protected] • [email protected] • [email protected]
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Management Science
دوره 49 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003