Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences
نویسنده
چکیده
In this note we show that in a pure exchange economy with two agents and a finite number of goods, there exists no strategy-proof, Pareto efficient and nondictatorial social choice allocation function on any local Cobb-Douglas preference domain. This is a slight extension of a result proved by Hashimoto (2008).
منابع مشابه
Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents
In this paper we show that in pure exchange economies there exists no Pareto efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism which ensures positive consumptions to all agents. We also show that Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and non-bossy allocation mechanism is dictatorial. We further show that if there exists three agents, then the allocation given by a Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, ...
متن کاملFaulty Nash Implementation in Exchange Economies with Single-peaked Preferences
In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz’s results (2002) of fault tolerant implementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008 a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of the k-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity and variants of k-monotonicity, are sufficient for implementability in kFault Tolerant Nash equilibri...
متن کاملAxioms for health care resource allocation.
This paper examines principles of health care resource allocation based on axioms for individual preferences and distributive justice. We establish axioms for representing individual preferences by quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), as well as axioms for existence of a social welfare function depending only on QALYs. A symmetric Cobb-Douglas social welfare function is characterized by an axio...
متن کاملThe Incentive Ratio in Exchange Economies
The incentive ratio measures the utility gains from strategic behaviour. Without any restrictions on the setup, ratios for linear, Leontief and Cobb–Douglas exchange markets are unbounded, showing that manipulating the equilibrium is a worthwhile endeavour, even if it is computationally challenging. Such unbounded improvements can be achieved even if agents only misreport their utility function...
متن کاملFeasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments
We consider N.T.U. and T.U. exchange economies in which initial endowments and preferences depend on the agentsprivate information. Every agent knows his own initial endowment, but his utility over consumption bundles possibly depends on the othersinformation (common values). We describe general allocation games in which agents make non-veri able claims about their types and e¤ective deposits...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 40 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013