On competitive equilibria with common complementarities
نویسنده
چکیده
We investigate the connection between equilibrium existence and its attainability through simple market mechanisms in exchange economies with indivisibilities and complementarities. The analysis suggests that attaining efficient outcomes through simple non-combinatorial auctions may be problematic even when market clearing prices exist. JEL classification code: C62, D44, D51
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Mathematical Social Sciences
دوره 46 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003