A Backward Induction Experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
1 We thank Menesh Patel and John Straub for research assistance and thank Vince Crawford for helpful comments. The instructions and data for the experiments reported in this paper are posted at http://www.nyu.edu/jet/supplementary.html. Financial support from the ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution at University College London, the National Science Foundation, and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 303 at the University of Bonn, is gratefully acknowledged. Ken Binmore
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 104 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002