Competitive search markets for durable goods

نویسندگان

  • Roman Inderst
  • Holger M. Müller
  • Jan Boone
  • Tilman Börgers
  • Jürgen Eichberger
  • Martin Hellwig
  • Benny Moldovanu
چکیده

This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof’s (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than lowquality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used to achieve separation.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Competitive supply of durable goods under stochastic fluctuation in stock

This paper presents a theoretical model in which the stock growth rate of durable goods has stochastic fluctuation over time. It concludes that a social planner increases the expected percentage rate of production since uncertainty increases the user cost from consumer’s point view.

متن کامل

Incentive Compatible Pricing Strategies for Product Differentiation in Durable-Goods Markets

Product differentiation in durable-goods markets is often complicated by the fact that decision processes for the market participants are intrinsically dynamic. For example, consumers can employ a variety of consumption patterns with actions that vary in time, even for a single brand of goods. Transaction costs in selling used goods prompt consumers to think ahead in order to avoid adverse lock...

متن کامل

How much competition is a secondary Market ? by Jiawei Chen , Susanna Esteban and Matthew Shum April 2010

Do active secondary markets aid or harm durable goods manufacturers? We build a dynamic equilibrium model of durable goods oligopoly, with consumers who incur lumpy costs when transacting in the secondary market, and calibrate it to U.S. automobile industry data. By varying transaction costs, we obtain a direct measure of the competitive pressure that secondary markets create on durable goods m...

متن کامل

How Much Competition is a Secondary Market?

Do active secondary markets aid or harm durable goods manufacturers? We build a dynamic equilibrium model of durable goods oligopoly, with consumers who incur lumpy costs when transacting in the secondary market, and calibrate it to U.S. automobile industry data. By varying transaction costs, we obtain a direct measure of the competitive pressure that secondary markets create on durable goods m...

متن کامل

Hyperbolic discounting and secondary markets

Does the existence of secondary markets for durable goods affect price and allocation on primary markets? We study competitive equilibria for durable goods where the possibility of future trade on secondary markets does not affect consumer behaviour in the primary market, provided consumers are exponential discounters. If consumers are hyperbolic discounters, however, secondary markets are no l...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2000