Balanced Stable Marriage: How Close is Close Enough?

نویسندگان

  • Sushmita Gupta
  • Sanjukta Roy
  • Saket Saurabh
  • Meirav Zehavi
چکیده

The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties, men and women. We study Balanced Stable Marriage from the viewpoint of Parameterized Complexity. Our “above guarantee parameterizations” are arguably the most natural parameterizations of the problem at hand. Indeed, our parameterizations precisely fit the scenario where there exists a stable marriage that both parties would accept, that is, where the satisfaction of each party is close to the best it can hope for. Furthermore, our parameterizations accurately draw the line between tractability and intractability with respect to the target value.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

The Average Number of Stable _ l / latchings

The probable behavior of am iuslance of size 1). of the stable marriage problem, chosen uniformly at rmdonl, is studied. Tl~e expected number of stable matchings is shown to be asymptotic t20 e-l77 In 1) for n m. The total rank of wonieu by nleu in the male optimal (pessimnl) matching is proven to be close to II In 11 (resp. T?.‘/ In j?), with high probability. 1980 Mat1~ema.tic.s Subject Class...

متن کامل

An Endogenous Sex Selection Model and a Test Using the Chinese Census

The parental sex selection behaviour of altruistic parents without gender specific preference in a monogamous marriage market is studied. Using an OLG model with intra-household resource allocation determined by marriage market bargaining, we find that the equlibrium with a balanced male/female ratio is unstable. Depending on the effect of the marriage market sex ratio on intra-household alloca...

متن کامل

Balanced list edge-colourings of bipartite graphs

Galvin solved the Dinitz conjecture by proving that bipartite graphs are ∆edge-choosable. We improve Galvin’s method and deduce from any colouring of the edges of bipartite graph G some further list edge-colouring properties of G. In particular, for bipartite graphs, it follows from the existence of balanced bipartite edge-colourings that balanced list edge-colourings exist as well. While the k...

متن کامل

Preference Elicitation and Interview Minimization in Stable Matchings

While stable matching problems are widely studied, little work has investigated schemes for effectively eliciting agent preferences using either preference (e.g., comparison) queries or interviews (to form such comparisons); and no work has addressed how to combine both. We develop a new model for representing and assessing agent preferences that accommodates both forms of information and (heur...

متن کامل

Fair Share Is Not Enough: Measuring Fairness in Scheduling with Cooperative Game Theory

We consider the problem of fair scheduling in a multi-organizational system in which organizations contribute their own resources to the global pool and the jobs to be processed on the common resources. We consider on-line, nonclairvoyant scheduling of sequential jobs without preemption. To ensure that the organizations are willing to cooperate the scheduling algorithm must be fair. To characte...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1707.09545  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2017