The Grand Failure : How Logistics of Supply Defeated Napoleon in 1812

I November of 1812, at the hamlet of Gara, Sergeant François Bourgogne admitted, “I am sure that if I had not found any horseflesh myself, I would have turned cannibal.”1 Bourgogne, a once dignified and proud member of the Imperial Guard, was brought to this macabre conclusion by the unfortunate events perpetuating Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. Bourgogne saw unprecedented death and destruction during the campaign. On this specific occasion, he witnessed many of his comrades burnt alive as they sought shelter in an overcrowded barn. As the building burned, the number of men inside prevented any escape, and it was reported that some soldiers who were not trapped took advantage of the opportunity to dine on their fallen brethren. Bourgogne found that he could not condemn this vile behavior, however, because he believed himself not above such an act, given the circumstance.2 The events that saw soldiers, like Bourgogne, completely demoralized and bereft of dignity began with the ambition of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. When Napoleon decided to invade Russia, he did not foresee how disastrous his decision would prove. Throughout the summer, fall, and winter of 1812, Napoleon saw his mighty Grande Armeé reduced from a fighting machine of over half a million trained soldiers, to a tattered and demoralized band of a few thousand. When the invasion was planned, Napoleon thought only of battling the Russian army; that he would fight Russian weather, poor infrastructure, peasants, and his own hubris did not occur to the leader. Though the French did not lose a single battle against the Russian Army until their infamous retreat, they began losing the battle with logistics and the Russian environment from almost the beginning of the campaign. Supplying a force the size of Napoleon’s army was a logistical nightmare for the French command. Survival instincts usurped humanity and discipline, culminating in the destruction of the Grande Armeé. The Invasion Begins When Czar Alexander I publicly disregarded the French Continental Blockade, Napoleon would not stand for such blatant contempt of French authority. The Emperor decided to take military action against the audacious Russians in order to force their obedience to the French embargo. By raising a massive Grande Armeé of over 600,000 men, Napoleon hoped to either intimidate the Russians into immediate capitulation, or bring the czar to his knees through a massive military engagement.3 Napoleon knew that the speed of travel would prove vital to the success of his operation; as a result, he intended the campaign to last a mere three weeks.4 Perhaps obviously, a foot soldier could travel much faster than a supply wagon, and so the Grande Armeé was to live off the land, taking what it needed from Russia instead of relying on lumbering supply wagons for sustenance. As the resources near the road were consumed, the soldiers were forced to branch out in search of supplies far from the main force. The decision to trust in the Russian land to supply his army was perhaps one of the greatest missteps of Napoleon’s military career. While some scholars posit that the Russian Winter or Russian army were the primary agents of the demise of the Grande Armeé, these theories understate a harsher reality: Napoleon’s own logistical oversight proved to be the greatest cause of his destruction in Russia.5 Alexander and his generals had no intention of allowing Napoleon’s plan to succeed on any level. The Russian prince Petr Ivanovich Bagration realized immediately what Napoleon did not: the Russian land would not be able to sustain a force of 200,000, let alone half a million soldiers.6 On August 21, 1812, when the Russian commanders were discussing how to go about conducting the war with Napoleon, Bagration proposed to Davidov, “What if they are left alone? The enemy army’s sources of strength and sustenance will be destroyed...The country on either side of the road is not sufficient to sustain 200,000 troops.”7 With this realization that Napoleon’s plan was one of unintentional self-destruction, the Russian command decided to feint and withdraw, pulling the Grande Armeé further into Russia. These leaders knew that each passing day brought the French army closer to starvation. Alexander would neither bow to the threat of the massive