Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper analyzes the effect of competition among downstream rms on an upstream rm’s payoff and on its incentive to integrate vertically when rms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as downstream competition becomes more intense, the upstream rm obtains a larger share of a smaller downstream industry prot. The upstream rm may encourage downstream competition (even excessively) in response to high downstream bargaining power. The option of vertical integration may be a barrier to entry downstream and may trigger strategic horizontal spinoffs or mergers. We extend the analysis to upstream competition.
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 1999