How Adverse Selection Affects the Health Insurance Market
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چکیده
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 2001