Doings and Subject Causation

In this paper I will be primarily concerned with doings or activities rather than with the more specific case of actions. Many things we do in our daily lives are not actions. A person caught in her thoughts might smile, scratch her head, stand up and walk around. Under normal circumstances these activities are not actions, they are only doings. Doings are often done without reason. The author of a doing need not notice what she does. Most bodily movements of human and non-human animals while awake are doings. Doings need not be controlled: the spontaneous laughter after hearing a joke, the crying of a baby that longs for the presence of a parent or the happy smile of surprise when meeting a friend unexpectedly are examples of doings without control. Nonetheless the person is active in her laughing, crying or smiling. Counterexamples are – under normal circumstances the movements of the heart or those involved in digestion. These things happen to the subject, they are not done; the subject is not actively involved. Not all doings involve visible movement. Directing one’s attention towards a particular problem, trying to remember a detail about the face of a person one was familiar with as a child, consciously and intentionally comparing the expected outcome of different possible causes of action are activities without bodily movement. Many philosophers think that only human animals are capable of genuine action. I will not discuss this controversial claim. But surely doings are not restricted to the human domain. The jump of a squirrel from one branch to the next, the yawning of a dog, the running away of a frightened mouse, all these are cases of genuine activities.