Evolutionary Dynamics of Q-Learning over the Sequence Form

Multi–agent learning is a challenging open task in artificial intelligence. It is known an interesting connection between multi–agent learning algorithms and evolutionary game theory, showing that the learning dynamics of some algorithms can be modeled as replicator dynamics with a mutation term. Inspired by the recent sequence–form replicator dynamics, we develop a new version of theQ–learning algorithm working on the sequence form of an extensive–form game allowing thus an exponential reduction of the dynamics length w.r.t. those of the normal form. The dynamics of the proposed algorithm can be modeled by using the sequence– form replicator dynamics with a mutation term. We show that, although sequence–form and normal–form replicator dynamics are realization equivalent, the Q– learning algorithm applied to the two forms have non– realization equivalent dynamics. Originally from the previous works on evolutionary game theory models form multi–agent learning, we produce an experimental evaluation to show the accuracy of the model.