Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options

نویسندگان

  • André Casajus
  • Andreas Tutic
چکیده

We introduce a weighted version of the component e¢ cient -value Casajus (2008, Games Econ Behav, forthcoming) for TU games with a coalition structure. This value can be viewed as the outcome of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to the players’problem of distributing their components’worth where the Shapley payo¤s serve as threat point. We provide characterizations both for exogenous and for endogenous weights. Further, the stability of coalition structures under this value is explored, and the weights are endogenized by socalled weight formation games. These concepts are applied to simple market games, i.e., the apex games and to the gloves games. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Number: C71.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Mathematical Social Sciences

دوره 66  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2013