Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce a weighted version of the component e¢ cient -value Casajus (2008, Games Econ Behav, forthcoming) for TU games with a coalition structure. This value can be viewed as the outcome of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to the playersproblem of distributing their componentsworth where the Shapley payo¤s serve as threat point. We provide characterizations both for exogenous and for endogenous weights. Further, the stability of coalition structures under this value is explored, and the weights are endogenized by socalled weight formation games. These concepts are applied to simple market games, i.e., the apex games and to the gloves games. Journal of Economic Literature Classi cation Number: C71.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Mathematical Social Sciences
دوره 66 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013