Conflict Management and the Duration of Interstate Disputes: Modeling the Effects and Time and Timing on Conflict Resolution

This paper develops a theoretical argument linking time and the timing of conflict management efforts to dispute duration. We test competing hypotheses on conflict data drawn from disputes in the post-1945 period. Our analysis demonstrates that the effects of mediation vary substantially over the course of a dispute. Specifically, we note that mediation has a curvilinear relationship with time and the ending of disputes. Mediation efforts that occur soon after disputes begin have the best chance reducing expected future dispute duration. Following this initial period, subsequent mediation efforts lead to longer rather than shorter disputes. After a long period, mediation again leads to shorter rather than longer disputes. We also find that there should be consistency in the mediators used to manage a conflict rather than shifting personnel to interject new ideas. Patrick M. Regan Department of Political Science Binghamton University (SUNY) Binghamton, NY 19902-6000 Tel: 607-777-2167 Fax: 607-777-2675 Email: [email protected] Allan C. Stam Department of Political Science Yale University New haven, CT 06520-8301 Tel: 203-432-6220 Fax: 203-432-6196 Email: [email protected] What is the effect of mediation on the duration of interstate disputes? Does the timing of a particular mediation attempt influence the overall duration of the dispute? These seemingly straightforward questions have proven remarkably resistant to systematic investigation. While all disputes between interstate actors eventually end, understanding how and when occupies a substantial part of the study of international relations. Most would agree that the likelihood of any single mediation attempt ending a dispute depends, in part, on the duration of the dispute and the timing of mediation. In order to be effective, mediation must take place at a propitious moment. Unfortunately, there is little agreement as to when that precise moment might actually occur. Bercovitch has argued, for example, that mediation would have its greatest effect at some middle point in a conflict: “Mediation, it seems, is more effective when it follows, rather than proceeds, some ‘test of strength’ between parties. The point in time following either some minimum duration (here defined as 12-36 months), a stalemate, or mutual exhaustion seems to be the ideal phase in the dispute to initiate mediation. Protracted and intense international disputes are not particularly amenable to mediation or other forms of third party intervention” (Bercovitch, 1986, pp 161). Of course, this ignores the question of how, ex ante, one would identify the middle of a dispute. Nor does it explain how, if the mediation effort took place at the halfway point (knowing the full length by ex post observation), we could conclude that mediation had anything to do with the diminution of the dispute’s duration. Bercovitch further posits that “[e]mpirical research suggests that neither premature nor belated mediations are especially likely to be effective. The most propitious time to initiate mediation is roughly halfway through the life cycle of the conflict”(1997:145). Northedge and Donelan (1971, pp 309) counter Bercovitch’s claim, maintaining that early intervention is the key to mediation success. “The timing of a mediation intervention is of the highest importance...once violence begins, it is likely too late.” From this viewpoint, for mediation to prevent conflicts from escalating, it must occur at the very outset. While many recognize that timing may play a crucial role in determining the effect of mediation on ending a conflict, most research designs executed to date have not been able to account for the dynamic effects of mediation on dispute duration. Our view of timing reflects closely that of Kriesberg's (1991:4) definition involving sequential actions. Interstate conflicts are not static events, but rather events that evolve over time. Evidence suggests that the sequencing and timing of state interactions determines, at least in part, the escalation patterns of interstate conflicts (Leng, 1983; Goertz and Diehl, 1995). At this point, however, no studies explicitly link the timing and sequence of conflict resolution efforts to the ending of international conflict. In this article,