Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia

Hovering over the peace negotiations in progress in former Yugoslavia is the international community's determination to bring to trial as war criminals those political and military leaders responsible for atrocities in Bosnia. The question clearly presented is that, however desirable the idea of war crimes accountability might appear in the abstract, pursuing the goal of a war crimes tribunal may simply result in prolonging a war of civilian atrocities. Is it not conceivable that, in return for securing a peace treaty, the UN officials may have extended some assurance to the leaders in former Yugoslavia that, one way or another, war crimes trials will not take place? Tags: Bosnia, War Crimes Tribunal (former Yugoslavia), War Criminals [pg500]** Peace negotiations, amid continued hostilities, are in progress in former Yugoslavia at the time of this writing. Hovering over the negotiations is the international community's determination to bring to trial as war criminals those political and military leaders responsible for atrocities in Bosnia, including rape [FN1] and "ethnic cleansing." The United Nations rapporteur for the establishment of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, M. Cherif Bassiouni, has articulated on numerous occasions the international community's determination to prosecute war criminals on all sides of the three-cornered war in Bosnia. However, some of the Serbian, Muslim and Croatian political and military leaders who are potential targets of the tribunal are participating in the peace negotiations. Is it realistic to expect them to agree to a peace settlement in Bosnia if, directly following the agreement, they may find themselves in the dock? If they, or their close associates and friends, face potential life imprisonment by simply signing a peace treaty, what incentive do they have to sign it? Sometimes international scholars have to proceed by inferring negotiations in the absence of an evidentiary record. How are we to know whether some United Nations officials, in their numerous and usually unrecorded meetings with Serbian, Muslim and Croatian leaders, may have privately acknowledged that it is unrealistic to expect a peace treaty in light of subsequent prosecutions for war crimes? Is it not at least conceivable that, in return for securing a peace treaty, the UN officials may have extended some form of assurance to the leaders in former Yugoslavia that, one way or another, the war crimes trials will not take place? If such assurances are being proffered in the Bosnian negotiations, they would of necessity have to be highly secret. World public opinion might not tolerate the idea of war criminals' being able to bargain their way out of prosecution for their crimes. Further complicating the issue is the fact that the United Nations officials engaged in the negotiations for peace in former Yugoslavia do not themselves have the authority to waive the right of the United Nations to prosecute war criminals. That right seems firmly established in the Security Council under chapter VII of the UN Charter.[FN2] Only the Council itself could trade its right to prosecute war criminals in former Yugoslavia in return for a final peace settlement in that troubled region. But even at the level of the Security Council, any such deal would probably have to be hidden under a veil of diplomatic secrecy, since the deal would presumably be severely criticized in the world