Imitation, Local Interaction, and Efficiency: Reappraisal
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چکیده
We revisit the model of Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006) but under the assumption that risk-dominant equilibria are Pareto efficient. It is found that risk-dominant equilibria, non-risk-dominant equilibria and some non-monomorphic states can emerge in the long run when players interact with their immediate neighbors only.
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تاریخ انتشار 2011