Good News about the Description Theory of Names

This is an attempt at reviving Kneale's version of the description theory of names, which says that a proper name is synonymous with a definite description of the form 'the individual named so-and-so'. To begin with, I adduce a wide range of observations to show that names and overt definites are alike in all relevant respects. I then turn to Kripke's main objection against Kneale's proposal, and endeavour to refute it. In the remainder of the paper I elaborate on Kneale's analysis, adopting a theory of presupposition proposed by van der Sandt. I N T R O D U C T I O N At the end of the first lecture of Naming and Necessity, Kripke gives short shrift to Kneale's version of the description theory of names, according to which the meaning of a name N is 'the individual named N\ I have always felt that Kripke's criticism of this view falls wide of the mark, and that Kneale's position is essentially correct. In the following pages I try to justify this assessment, referring to Kneale's theory and its kin as 'quotation theories'; for their central claim is that the content of a name quotes the name itself. Although occasionally Russell came quite close to defending the quotation theory, to the best of my knowledge its first proponent was Kneale (1962), who was taken to task for this by Kripke (1980). Subsequently the theory received support from Loar (1976), Bach (1981, 1987), Cresswell (1985), and Fodor (1987). More recently, a number of presupposition theorists have swelled the ranks of the quotation theory: it is more or less taken for granted by van der Sandt and Geurts (1991), van der Sandt (1992), Beaver (1993), and Geurts (1995), among others. And Zeevat (1996) argues at some greater length for a presuppositional version of the quotation theory that is more or less the same as mine. My defence of the quotation theory is part of a larger project, which is to provide an alternative for semantic analyses built upon such notions as rigid designation or direct reference. Despite their considerable intuitive appeal, I believe that these notions are red herrings, regardless whether they are deployed in the analysis of names, demonstratives, natural kind terms, or wherever. But in this paper the focus will be entirely on proper names.' 320 Good News about the Description Theory of Names i NAMES AND OTHER DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS I claim that a name is synonymous with a definite NP of the form 'the individual named so-and-so'. For the time being we can leave the proposed analysis in this somewhat underspecified state, because I first want to raise a number of points that don't require a more precise formulation. If the quotation theory is correct, then names must be expected to be used and interpreted like other definite NPs. If, on the other hand, names are rigid designators, then we should expect significant empirical differences between names and definite NPs. I will now show that it is the former prediction rather than the latter that is borne out by the facts. The main objectives of this section are to take stock of the semantic properties of names and definite NPs, and to show that there do not seem to be any fundamental differences between these two types of expressions. I will freely help myself to whatever technical jargon I find convenient for these purposes. For example, I will sometimes pretend that names and definites have scope but will also talk of their 'referents'. This terminological brie a brae should not be taken too seriously. Taken together, the following observations strongly suggest that names pattern with (other) definite NPs in all relevant respects: • Names often take the form of definite NPs: 'the United Nations', 'the Goldberg Variations', 'the Netherlands', 'the Annunciation', 'the Holy Spirit', 'the Bank of England'. These are names, no doubt, but they certainly look like definite NPs. In English, river names always carry a definite article ('the Mississippi'). In Italian, names of women often have, and sometimes must have, a definite article: 'la Loren', 'la Carolina'. I suspect that all languages which have definiteness markers allow them to occur on proper names, and I wouldn't be surprised if there were languages in which names were always marked for definiteness. • So-called definiteness effects apply to names and definite NPs alike. On the one hand, if a construction selects for indefinite (or weak) NPs, names as well as definite NPs are excluded. This holds for English t/iere-sentences, for example: (1) There is {*John/*the philosopher/a philosopher) available. On the other hand, if a construction selects for definite NPs, it will accept names, too, as the case of the partitive construction illustrates: (2) half of {Belgium/the country/*some countries} • As Kripke (1980) points out, Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction applies to names just as it applies to definite NPs. In Kripke's