Perplexity and meaning: toward a phenomenological "core" of psychotic experiences.

The experiences of people with psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia have long been considered “incomprehensible.”1 However, more recently the incomprehensibility of psychosis has been brought into doubt by more phenomenologically oriented researchers who view psychosis not only as the result of aberrant neurobiology but also as a disorder of self-awareness and experience.2,3 To propose the idea that psychosis has no biochemical or genetic bearing is extremely naive to say the least, if not outright dangerous. Nevertheless, to negate the phenomenological perspective is also counterproductive. Phenomenology may well lie at the “core” of psychotic experiences just like any other human experience; in this article, I aim to use some of the available evidence of phenomenological research in psychosis, taking into account first-person perspectives as important factors, in order to put forward this argument.