The Source of Walras’s Idealist Bias: a Review of Koppl’s Solution to the Walras Paradox

In the last decade, with the publication of his Complete Works, there has been renewed interest in Walras’s methodology, mostly in the French economic literature. In particular, some scholars have argued that Walras characteristically confused positive and normative statements, a mistake all the more surprising given his impressive knowledge of philosophy (the so-called ‘Walras paradox’). This paper reviews these recent studies and, in particular, it contests the solution to the Walras paradox offered by R. Koppl. For Koppl, the paradox is explained by the fact that Walras was influenced by philosophers who did not distinguish between positive and normative statements. More precisely, the French philosopher E. Vacherot inspired him to an idealist theory of knowledge, where preconceived notions of justice could be defended as truths. This paper contests such a conclusion: Vacherot’s theory of science was not idealist and did not sanction a confusion of positive and normative statements. The Walras paradox could even be non-existent after all.