Security Games: Solution Concepts and Algorithms
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چکیده
Security Games: Solution Concepts and Algorithms
منابع مشابه
Cooperative Benefit and Cost Games under Fairness Concerns
Solution concepts in cooperative games are based on either cost games or benefit games. Although cost games and benefit games are strategically equivalent, that is not the case in general for solution concepts. Motivated by this important observation, a new property called invariance property with respect to benefit/cost allocation is introduced in this paper. Since such a property can be regar...
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