Coalitional Manipulation on Communication Network

In an abstract model of division problems, we study division rules that are not manipulable through a reallocation of individual characteristic vectors within a coalition (e.g. reallocation of claims in bankruptcy problems). A coalition can be formed under a given communication network, a (non-directed) graph, if members of this coalition are connected on the graph. We offer a characterization of nonmanipulable division rules without any assumption on the graph structure. When the graph is complete, this result reduces to the results established by previous authors. We also consider other special cases such as trees and graphs without a “bridge”. The family of reallocation-proof rules can get larger or smaller depending on the graph structure. Our abstract model can have various special examples such as bankruptcy, surplus sharing, cost sharing, income redistribution, social choice with transferable utility, etc. JEL Classification: C71, D30, D63, D71.