Vote Timing and Information Aggregation
نویسنده
چکیده
Drawing upon recent results on bandwagons in sequential voting, and by deriving analogous results for simultaneous voting, I compare the information aggregation properties of the two processes. The conclusions con...rm commonly held views about the front-loading of presidential primaries: that in tight races a simultaneous vote is preferred as it is more likely to lead to the selection of the “better” candidate, but in lopsided races a sequential vote is preferred. Strangely, the superior performance of sequential voting in lopsided races is precisely because bandwagons occur. ¤Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208; [email protected].
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