NICHOLAS ASHER and DANIEL BONEVAC FREE CHOICE PERMISSION IS STRONG PERMISSION
نویسنده
چکیده
Free choice permission, a crucial test case concerning the semantics/ pragmatics boundary, usually receives a pragmatic treatment. But its pragmatic features follow from its semantics. We observe that free choice inferences are defeasible, and defend a semantics of free choice permission as strong permission expressed in terms of a modal conditional in a nonmonotonic logic.
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