Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games*
نویسندگان
چکیده
A class of signaling games is studied in which a unique Universally Divine equilibrium outcome exists. We identify a monotonicity property under which a variation of Universal Divinity is generically equivalent to strategic stability. Further assumptions guarantee the existence of a unique Universally Divine outcome. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 021, 022, 026. ‘r 1990 Academic
منابع مشابه
On Uniqueness and Stability of symmetric equilibria in differentiable symmetric games∗
Higher-dimensional symmetric games become of more and more importance for applied microand macroeconomic research. Standard approaches to uniqueness of equilibria have the drawback that they are restrictive or not easy to evaluate analytically. In this paper I provide some general but comparably simple tools to verify whether a symmetric game has a unique symmetric equilibrium or not. I disting...
متن کاملDynamic system of strategic games
Maybe an event can't be modeled completely through one game but there is more chance with several games. With emphasis on players' rationality, we present new properties of strategic games, which result in production of other games. Here, a new attitude to modeling will be presented in game theory as dynamic system of strategic games and its some applications such as analysis of the clash betwe...
متن کاملHeterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games
Incomplete information games, local interaction games and randommatching games are all special cases of a general class of interaction games (Morris (1997)). In this paper, we use this equivalence to present a uniÞed treatment of arguments generating uniqueness in games with strategic complementarities by introducing heterogeneity in these di¤erent settings. We also report on the relation betwe...
متن کاملStrategic Form Games and Nash Equilibrium
This article introduces strategic form games, which provide a framework for the analysis of strategic interactions in multi-agent environments. We present the main solution concept in strategic form games, Nash equilibrium, and provide tools for its systematic study. We present fundamental results for existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and discuss their efficiency properties. We conclu...
متن کاملChoice-theoretic Solutions for Strategic Form Games
We model a player’s decision as a choice set and analyze equilibria in which each player’s choice set is a best response to the other players’ sets. We formalize the notion of best response by an abstract “choice structure,” which captures iteratively undominated strategies (for several definitions of dominance), rationalizability, and a number of formulations of choice sets. We investigate pro...
متن کامل