Divorce-Law Changes, Household Bargaining, and Married Women's Labor Supply Revisited
نویسنده
چکیده
Divorce law changes made in the 1970s affected marital formation, dissolution, and bargaining within marriage. By altering the terms of the marital contract these legal changes impacted the incentives for women to enter and remain in the labor force. Whereas earlier work had suggested that the impact of unilateral divorce on female employment depended critically on laws governing property division, I show that these results are not robust to alternative specifications and controls. I find instead that unilateral divorce led to an increase in both married and unmarried female labor force participation, regardless of the underlying property laws.
منابع مشابه
1 Divorce Law and Women ’ s Labor Supply
Divorce law changes made in the 1970s affected marital formation, dissolution, and bargaining within marriage. By altering the terms of the marital contract these legal changes impacted the incentives for women to enter and remain in the labor force. Whereas earlier work had suggested that the impact of unilateral divorce on female employment depended critically on laws governing property divis...
متن کاملDivorce Law and Women’s Labor Supply
Divorce law changes made in the 1970s affected marital formation, dissolution, and bargaining within marriage. By altering the terms of the marital contract these legal changes impacted the incentives for women to enter and remain in the labor force. Whereas earlier work had suggested that the impact of unilateral divorce on female employment depended critically on laws governing property divis...
متن کاملWhy Are Married Men Working So Much? Home Production, Household Bargaining and Per-Capita Hours
Why Are Married Men Working So Much? Home Production, Household Bargaining and Per-Capita Hours Empirical patterns of labor supply at the micro level tend to reject the unitary model assumption implicit in most macro theories, where households are the deemed to be rational agents. This paper examines the rise in per-capita labor since 1975 and asks how the inclusion of bargaining between spouse...
متن کاملCooperative Models in Action: Simulation of a Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Labor Supply with Taxation
Cooperative Models in Action: Simulation of a Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Labor Supply with Taxation Several theoretical contributions, starting with McElroy and Horney (1981) and Manser and Brown (1980), have suggested to model household behavior as a Nash-bargaining game. Since then, very few attempts have been made to operationalize cooperative models of household labor supply for pol...
متن کاملHow important is anticipation of divorce in married women’s labor supply decisions? An intercohort comparison using NLS data
I compare two birth-cohorts of married women and find that divorce-risk plays a significantly smaller role in the recent cohort’s labor supply decision. This suggests that any decline in America’s divorce rates will not substantially reduce married women’s labor supply. 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
متن کامل