Exclusivism in Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis

In An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, John Hick presents an impressive theory of religious pluralism. His theory is intended to explain how it may be that all of the great religious traditions are essentially true despite their apparent contradictions. Hick points out that there are many religions in the world, each of which seems to be incompatible with others. For those who do not wish to deny that there is any truth in religion and at the same time do not wish to claim that one religion is true and all others delusory, there is, Hick says, a need for a pluralistic hypothesis—a hypothesis that would explain how different religions could be true. Hick argues that we need a pluralistic hypothesis because it is unreasonably arbitrary to be religious exclusivists—that is, to accept the truth of our own religious tradition while denying that of other religious traditions. This follows because adherents of other religions have the exact same sort of justification for their religious beliefs that we have for our own—namely, religious experience (Interpretation 235). This assertion has been criticized, but for the sake of argument, I will assume that it is correct. However, since Hick only includes a few religions in his discussion, I will argue that his pluralistic hypothesis is guilty of the very same “unreasonable arbitrariness” for which he criticizes exclusivism. Thus, if Hick correctly supposes that we need a hypothesis that avoids this “implausible arbitrariness,” his own hypothesis is inadequate. I will consider two objections to my argument, and I will also suggest how Hick’s hypothesis could be modified to overcome its inadequacy.