Axiomatic Justification of Stable Equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
A solution concept that satisfies the axioms of invariance and strong backward induction selects a stable set of a game’s equilibria.
منابع مشابه
Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Generic Payoffs
Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling games in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies (admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and dependence only on the game’s normal form even when embedded in a larger game with redundant strategies or irrelevant players (small worlds). The axio...
متن کاملLearning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria
This paper provides a learning justification for limited forecast equilibria, i.e., Ž . strategy profiles such that 1 players choose their actions in order to maximize the discounted average payoff over their horizon of foresight as given by their forecasts Ž . and 2 forecasts are correct on and off the equilibrium path. The limited forecast equilibria appear to be the stochastically stable out...
متن کاملNon-robustness of the Cash-in-advance Equilibrium in the Trading-Post Model
The main justification for cash-in-advance (CIA) equilibria when there are multiple assets is a Shapley-Shubik trading-post model where the agents coordinate on a particular medium of exchange. Of course, there are other equilibria. We introduce a refinement and show that the CIA equilibrium does not satisfy our refinement while there exist equilibria that do.
متن کاملNo . 1896 Justification of Stable Equilibria
Two assumptions are used to justify selection of equilibria in stable sets. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to addition of redundant strategies. The other is a strong version of backward induction. Backward induction is interpreted as the requirement that behavior strategies in an extensive-form game are sequentially rational and conditionally admissible at every inform...
متن کاملHow long is a piece of string? An exploration of multi-winner approval voting and ballot-length restrictions
Multi-winner approval elections are seen in a variety of settings ranging from academic societies and associations to public elections. In such elections, it is often the case that ballot-length restrictions are enforced; that is, where voters have a limit on the number of candidates which they can vote for. Despite this common feature, there does not seem to be any theoretical justification fo...
متن کامل