Enough and as Good: a Formal Model of Lockean First Appropriation

In developing a theory of the rst appropriation of natural resources from the state of nature John Locke tells us that persons must leave enough and as good for others. Detailing exactly what this restriction requires divides right and left libertarians. Brie y, right libertarians interpret enough and as good as requiring no or very minimal restrictions on the rst appropriation of natural resources, whereas left libertarians interpret enough and as good as requiring everyone be entitled to an equal share of unappropriated resources, able to claim no more beyond this equal share. This paper approaches the right versus left libertarian debate by developing a formal model that examines the welfare properties of di erent interpretations of the Lockean proviso. The model shows that underlying philosophical justi cations for left libertarianism, when plausible assumptions hold, will actually be better served by a right libertarian proviso rather than a left libertarian one.