A framework and theory for cyber security assessments

Information system security risk, defined as the product of the monetary losses associated with security incidents and the probability that they occur, is a suitable decision criterion when considering different information system architectures. This paper describes how probabilistic relational models can be used to specify architecture metamodels so that security risk can be inferred from metamodel-instantiations. A probabilistic relational model contains classes, attributes, and class-relationships. It can be used to specify architectural metamodels similar to class diagrams in the Unified Modeling Language. In addition, a probabilistic relational model makes it possible to associate a probabilistic dependency model to the attributes of classes in the architectural metamodel. This paper proposes a set of abstract classes that can be used to create probabilistic relational models so that they enable inference of security risk from instantiated architecture models. If an architecture metamodel is created by specializing the abstract classes proposed in this paper, the instantiations of the metamodel will generate a probabilistic dependency model that can be used to calculate the security risk associated with these instantiations. The abstract classes make it possible to derive the dependency model and calculate security risk from an instance model that only specifies assets and their relationships to each other. Hence, the person instantiating the architecture metamodel is not required to assess complex security attributes to quantify security risk using the instance model. Paper A: A probabilistic relational model for security risk analysis