The confluence of evidence-based practice and Daubert within the fields of forensic psychiatry and the law.

Early in the 1990s, two separate and equally momentous events occurred, both of which would change the connection between forensic psychiatry and the law. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and evidence-based practice (EBP) both emerged as elements that would stimulate assessment of the best available scientific evidence to be employed in reaching judicial decisions. Both emphasize that research methods supporting evidence should be critically appraised before findings can be extrapolated within the legal (Daubert) or the practice (EBP) context. In addition, both created a shift toward transparent procedures for answering scientific questions. Although these similarities seem compelling, both have existed essentially independent of each other. This special issue of the Journal will describe the decisive link between Daubert and EBP. The articles address the methods, procedures, tests, and interventions commonly used in forensic psychiatry. Experts in their respective fields address the application of EBP by focusing on the “conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence” (Ref. 2, p 71), to explore topics relevant to forensic psychiatry. The authors report their findings with special emphasis on the potential rate of error, exploration of the variances found in the overall results, and the limits and boundaries of generalizing their findings. Although both Daubert and EBP are well known within the field of forensic psychiatry, neither is without controversy and both remain largely misunderstood. Daubert may be one of the Supreme Court decisions best known by forensic psychiatrists, with numerous articles on the subject, but there are various opinions about the kinds of evidence that are admissible within the Daubert standard. Similarly, EBP has been adopted by many as the gold standard for practice, but it has also been criticized as counterintuitive, relying too much on randomized control trials, being too reductionist, promoting a cookbook approach, and ignoring the complexity and context in which evidence is used.